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TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE 
GROWING HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN RUSSIA: A CASE 
FOR EXPANDED HEALTH PRIVACY 
Carrie C. Gage† 
Abstract: The Russian Federation faces one of the fastest growing rates of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) infection in the world.  In 1995, Russia 
adopted comprehensive legislation addressing HIV and the disease caused by this virus, 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”).  The legislation prohibited 
discrimination based on HIV infection and provided access to medical care for people 
living with HIV/AIDS.  Having recognized that Injecting Drug Users involved in sex 
work will likely act as a bridge to the general population, the Russian government has 
recently taken greater steps to curb transmission.  Russia has moved to decriminalize the 
distribution of hypodermic needles for prevention of infectious diseases and has 
committed to increasing HIV/AIDS funding. Given the Russian government’s recent 
dedication of additional funding to combat HIV/AIDS, this Comment seeks to identify 
potential barriers to HIV/AIDS prevention in existing Russian law.  In both testing and 
treatment, inadequate protection of private health information may discourage individuals 
from learning their HIV status and seeking treatment.  As such, an effective legislative 
solution to Russia’s growing epidemic must include greater protections for health 
privacy.  Comprehensive health privacy legislation in the United States may provide a 
framework for enhancing existing health privacy protections for individuals living with 
HIV/AIDS in Russia.  Despite differences between the legal systems of Russia and the 
United States, Russian law, like American law addressing health privacy, should clarify 
the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation of that right, and 
the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“If the [Russian] leadership continues to pay only lip service to the 
issue [of HIV/AIDS] . . . then the consequences . . . will be devastating 
to . . . society, to family formation, to the military, to productivity of labor, 
[and] to continued growth of the gross domestic product.”1  Russia faces one 
of the fastest growing rates of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) 
infection in the world.2  The HIV epidemic there has been characterized by 
“explosive outbreaks among vulnerable populations . . . .”3  Between 1997 
                                           
†
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1
 Peter Finn, HIV/AIDS in Russia May Be Triple Official Rate, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at A2 
(quoting MURRAY FESHBACH & CRISTINA M. GALVIN, HIV/AIDS IN RUSSIA – AN ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 
(Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, 2005)). 
2
 WHO, SUMMARY COUNTRY PROFILE FOR HIV/AIDS TREATMENT SCALE-UP: RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION (2005), http://www.who.int/hiv/HIVCP_RUS.pdf. 
3
 Catherine M. Lowndes et al., Conditions for Widespread Heterosexual Spread of HIV in the 
Russian Federation: Implications for Research, Monitoring and Prevention, 14 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 45, 49 
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and 2005, the number of officially registered HIV positive individuals in 
Russia ballooned from 3623 to 327,899.4  While estimates vary, it is likely 
that one million Russians (over one percent of the population) are infected.5  
At the current rate of infection, more than fourteen million Russians could 
be infected with HIV by the year 2020.6 
In 1995, the Russian Federation adopted comprehensive legislation 
prohibiting discrimination based on HIV infection or Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”).7  Because of the potential for Injecting 
Drug Users (“IDUs”) to act as a bridge to the general population,8 the 
Russian government has begun to take greater legislative steps to stem the 
epidemic, and, in 2006, committed greatly increased funds to HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment.9 
Yet more than ten years after the passage of comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS legislation, Russians living with HIV/AIDS continue to face 
discrimination based on their health status.10  Knowledge that HIV test 
results will remain confidential may encourage individuals to get tested.11  
Conversely, a lack of adequate protection for private health information may 
discourage individuals from learning their health status and seeking 
treatment.  While Russian law provides protections for health privacy—
which may include information related to HIV infection—the parameters of 
such protections are largely undefined in the law.12 
                                                                                                                              
(2003).   An epidemic is classified as “an outbreak of disease among members of a specific population that 
exceeds the extent of occurrence of the disease normally found in that population.”  Marc Kusinitz, 
Epidemic, 2 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE 1498, 1498 (K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Lerner eds., 2004).  A 
single case of an unexpected disease can indicate an epidemic.  S. Ryan Johansson, Epidemics, 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULATION 302, 302 (Paul Demeny & Geoffrey McNicoll eds., 2003).  Generally, 
“[e]pidemic diseases break out, reach a peak, and subside . . . .”  Id. 
4
  WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
5
  To Slow AIDS in Russia, Treat HIV-Positive Addicts, Stanford Study Says, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 9, 
2006 [hereinafter To Slow AIDS in Russia]. 
6
  Erika Niedowski, Russia Resists Needle Swap: Officially, Exchanges ‘Taboo’ in Nation With High 
HIV Rate, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jul. 9, 2006. 
7
  See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 1995, No. 14, Item 1212 (“Federal Law No. 38-FZ of March 30, 1995 on the Prevention of the 
Incidence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Disease in the Russian Federation”) [hereinafter 
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation]. 
8
  See Tim Rhodes et al., HIV Transmission and HIV Prevention Associated with Injecting Drug Use 
in the Russian Federation, 15 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) (noting emerging evidence of the 
stabilization of infection among IDUs rates, together with increased sexual transmission). 
9
  WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
10
 See infra Part II.B. 
11
 See Sheri D. Weiser et al., Routine HIV Testing in Botswana: A Population-Based Study on 
Attitudes, Practices, and Human Rights Concerns, 3 PLOS MED. 1013, 1018 (2006). 
12
  See infra Part IV. 
JANUARY 2008 HEALTH PRIVACY IN RUSSIA 159 
  
Given the Russian government’s recent dedication to combating the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, this Comment seeks to identify potential barriers to 
HIV prevention in Russian law.  Part II of this Comment examines how 
social stigma related to drug use and to HIV infection in Russia has hindered 
voluntary HIV testing and concludes that additional protections for health 
status may encourage individuals to seek care.13  Part III contends that 
because the perceived privacy of health-related information may encourage 
HIV testing which, in turn, may reduce transmission, Russian law related to 
HIV/AIDS should contain strong protections for health privacy.  Part IV 
argues that Russian law expressly protects the right to health privacy, but 
contends that conflict in existing law leaves the parameters of health privacy 
uncertain.  Part V establishes that a lack of clear remedies for violations of 
health privacy exacerbates the unclear parameters of health privacy 
protection.  Part VI compares Russian laws protecting health privacy to 
comprehensive health privacy legislation in the United States, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).14  It concludes that, 
despite jurisdictional and institutional differences between the United States 
and Russia, Russian law should, like HIPAA, clarify the statutory right to 
health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation of that right, and the path to 
legal redress for the right’s infringement. 
II. SOCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
SPREAD, AND HAVE HINDERED TREATMENT, OF HIV/AIDS IN RUSSIA 
Various social factors, including injection drug use, have contributed 
to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Russia.15  Against this social background, the 
Russian government has historically allocated little money to HIV/AIDS 
care,16  and legislative enactments have impeded treatment of IDUs.17  Yet a 
recent increase in funding for HIV/AIDS indicates heightened governmental 
attention to the growing epidemic.18 
                                           
13
  This Comment assumes that individuals who seek care will have access to treatment.  While HIV 
care is already guaranteed under Russian law, currently the need for antiretroviral (“ARV”) therapy greatly 
exceeds availability and, as of 2004, less than 3% of those in need of ARV therapy were receiving it.  See 
WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
14
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d-2)-(d-7) (2000).   
15
  See infra Part II.A-B. 
16
  See infra Part II.C. 
17
  See infra Part II.D. 
18
  See infra Part II.E. 
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A. Social Factors Have Aided HIV/AIDS Transmission and Impacted 
Disease Progression 
Various social factors have impacted HIV transmission and disease 
progress in Russia.19  Sex work has played an increasingly important role in 
transmission, especially due to widespread lack of condom use.20  The 
spread of HIV/AIDS has also been linked to conditions of the Russian penal 
system which, by 1998, held about one million people.21  Because prisons 
may house many thousands of infected and non-infected individuals 
together,22 “[they] are likely to serve as ‘incubators’ in which the virus will 
spread rapidly.”23  By 2001, HIV was twenty-six times as prevalent within 
the prison population as within the general public.24  Finally, the co-
occurrence of other infectious diseases has complicated Russia’s growing 
HIV epidemic.25  For example, poverty and unemployment have contributed 
to rapid growth in Tuberculosis (“TB”) in Russia.26  In turn, TB is a leading 
cause of mortality for people living with HIV/AIDS.27 
But most importantly, HIV transmission in Russia is linked to 
injection drug use.  The current epidemic is concentrated among IDUs,28 
with approximately ninety percent of infections associated with injection 
drug use.29  After the fall of the Soviet Union, accessible borders led to a 
“boom of illegal markets,” particularly in narcotics.30  Russia now has 
between 1.5 and 3.5 million IDUs.31  Consequently, any program to reduce 
HIV transmission in Russia should target this population.32 
                                           
19
  See David E. Powell, The Problem of AIDS, in RUSSIA’S TORN SAFETY NETS: HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE DURING THE TRANSITION 123, 128-32 (Mark G. Field & Judyth L. Twigg eds., 2000).   
20
  See id. at 128. 
21
  Id. at 130. 
22
  William E. Butler, Injecting Drug Use and HIV: Harm-Reduction Programs and the Russian 
Legal System, in RULING RUSSIA: LAW, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 205, 206 (William 
Alex Pridemore ed., 2005). 
23
  Powell, supra note 19, at 130. 
24
  ANATOLY VINOKUR ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 510, THE 
TB AND HIV/AIDS EPIDEMICS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 33 (2001). 
25
  See A. Van Rie et al., TB and HIV in St. Petersburg, Russia: A Looming Catastrophe?  9 INT’L J. 
OF TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 740, 740 (2005). 
26
  Id. at 740. 
27
  Id. at 742. 
28
  WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
29
  Rhodes et al., supra note 8, at 2. 
30
  Letizia Paoli, The Price of Freedom: Illegal Drug Markets and Policies in Post-Soviet Russia, 582 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 167, 168 (2002);  see also Butler, supra note 22, at 207 (noting that 
between 1993 and 2001, the conviction rate for narcotics crimes may have increased by as much as 500 
percent). 
31
  WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
32
  See To Slow AIDS in Russia, supra note 5. 
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B. The Stigma Surrounding HIV Infection Impedes Treatment 
Discriminatory attitudes in Russia toward HIV infection act as a 
barrier to treatment.  In Russia, discrimination against people living with 
HIV/AIDS is common.33  Among the general public, there is a lack of 
knowledge of the basic facts of HIV/AIDS transmission,34 and a generalized 
fear of contracting the disease.35  Likewise, ignorance about the spread of 
HIV/AIDS is widespread among health professionals in Russia.36  The 
Russian Chief Sanitary Doctor, Gennady Onishchenko, calls discrimination 
“[t]he main obstacle in the fight against AIDS.”37  According to 
Onishchenko, discrimination has resulted in economic losses for Russia, 
because HIV positive youth are often “categorized as outcasts.”38  In a 2006 
study of HIV infection in Russia, researchers concluded that addressing 
stigma is essential to encouraging testing and combating the disease.39 
C. HIV/AIDS Policy Has Focused on Untargeted Testing Rather than 
Treatment 
Resources for treatment of individuals living with HIV/AIDS in 
Russia vary widely,40 and health care professionals often lack access to new 
drugs.41  While the World Health Organization (“WHO”) recommends that 
countries allocate five percent of their Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) to 
health care, Russia allocates less than three percent.42  Thus, in 2005, fewer 
than one percent of those currently infected with HIV in Russia, about five 
thousand patients, received antiretroviral (“ARV”) therapy,43 drug regimens 
which disrupt the progression of HIV.44 
                                           
33
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LESSONS NOT LEARNED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND HIV/AIDS IN THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 13 (2004). 
34
  Id.; see also Y. Balabanova et al., Stigma and HIV Infection in Russia, 18 AIDS CARE 846, 850 
(2006) (noting that in a recent study of attitudes towards HIV infection in Russia, a participant explained, “I 
know how to protect myself.  Use condoms, be careful on the buses, don’t touch handrails.”). 
35
  Powell, supra note 19, at 132. 
36
  See id. at 124. 
37
  Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses Due to Discrimination Against HIV-Infected, DAILY 
NEWS BULL., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses]. 
38
  Id. 
39
  Balabanova et al., supra note 34, at 846. 
40
  Powell, supra note 19, at 136-37. 
41
  Id. 
42
  Id. at 132. 
43
  To Slow AIDS in Russia, supra note 5. 
44
 UNAIDS, Antiretroviral Therapy, http://www.unaids.org/en/Issues/Prevention_treatment/ 
antiretroviral_therapy.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
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While governmental contribution to health care has been relatively 
small, the Russian government has traditionally focused on HIV screening.45  
Twenty million people were screened for HIV infection each year between 
1991 and 1999.46  Many of these individuals were subject to mandatory 
screening.47  Not only can such untargeted screening of healthy individuals 
“squander[]” public funds,48 but data derived from screening may be 
ambiguous.49  For example, such generalized screening “may . . .  
underestimate the true proportion of at-risk populations infected, as [it] may 
cover non-injectors and populations at lower risk . . . .”50  In addition, data 
derived from such screening related to HIV prevalence, or the total number 
of cases of disease,51 are “poor at detecting changes in” the rate of infection, 
and, thus, are also poor at signaling “changes in the course of the 
epidemic . . . .”52  Therefore, while Russian “mass surveillance” represents a 
“traditional [approach to] infectious disease control,”53 and while testing is 
essential to provision of effective treatment,54 more targeted surveillance of 
defined high-risk groups could better elucidate the dynamics of HIV 
transmission in Russia.55 
D. The Status of Harm Reduction Programs in Russia Remains 
Uncertain, Discouraging IDUs’ Access to Treatment 
In addition to focusing on screening rather than treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, the Russian government has promoted inconsistent policy 
toward needle exchange programs.  Between thirty and forty percent of 
Russian IDUs may share needles within a four week period.56  International 
studies have demonstrated a decreased risk of syringe-sharing among 
                                           
45
  Powell, supra note 19, at 136. 
46
  VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38. 
47
  Powell, supra note 19, at 136. 
48
  David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Uses and Abuses of Screening Tests, 359 LANCET 881, 
881 (2002). 
49
  See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 55. 
50
  Id. (noting that in 2000, official HIV prevalence of registered IDUs in Russia was only 5%, a 
number much lower than that derived from clinical studies). 
51
  John M. Last, Incidence and Prevalence, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC HEALTH 609, 609 (Lester 
Breslow ed., 2002). 
52
  Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 55-56. 
53
  Id. at 55. 
54
  See infra Part III. 
55
  See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 56-57. 
56
  Rhodes et al., supra note 8, at 11. 
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participants in needle exchange programs.57  Such programs are considered a 
method of “harm reduction” intended to limit the damage caused by drug 
use.58  Yet, while a recent amendment to the Russian Criminal Code 
legalizes needle exchanges where needles are distributed to deter infectious 
disease,59 the Ministry of Health has yet to issue guidelines for distribution 
of needles.60  As such, needle exchanges have not yet been incorporated into 
law, a move which could require changes to as many as two dozen legal 
enactments.61 
In the absence of such regulations, officials have refused to promote,62 
and law enforcement authorities have often impeded,63 needle exchange 
programs.  Harassment by police in such contexts contributes to risky 
behavior of IDUs.64  For example, a 2006 study demonstrated that Russian 
IDUs who had attempted to utilize needle exchange programs were often 
discouraged because of arrests of participants.65  By 2004, there were 
approximately seventy-five needle exchange programs operating in Russia.66  
As of 2006, only sixty programs were in operation,67 perhaps a result of 
inconsistent policy toward harm reduction. 
E. Recent Policy Changes Indicate Heightened Governmental 
Acknowledgement of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic 
While the Russian government has historically allocated limited 
resources to HIV/AIDS treatment, the last five years have been a period of 
increased advocacy.68  Recently, President Vladimir Putin referred to 
HIV/AIDS in Russia as “an acute problem, [requiring] the attention of all 
                                           
57
  Id. at 8 (citing e.g., F.I. Bastos & S. Strathdee, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Syringe Exchange 
Programs, 51 SOC. SCI. & MED., 1771 (2000); D. Des Jarlais et al., HIV Incidence Among Injection Drug 
Users in New York City Syringe-Exchange Programs, 348 LANCET 987 (1996)). 
58
  Niedowski, supra note 6. 
59
  Id. at 1; see Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 50, Item 4848, art. 230 (“Federal Law No. 162-FZ of 2003 on 
Introducing Amendments and Additions into the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation”) [hereinafter 
Criminal Code Amendments]. 
60
  Niedowski, supra note 6. 
61
  Butler, supra note 22, at 219 (noting that, while harm-reduction centers often distribute bleach and 
teach clients to sterilize needles, the distribution of bleach in Russia requires a license.) 
62
  Niedowski, supra note 6. 
63
  VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 39. 
64
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 18. 
65
  Balabanova et al., supra note 34, at 849. 
66
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 17. 
67
  Niedowski, supra note 6. 
68
  Terry Murray, Fending Off Another Africa: A Look at Emerging HIV Hotspots, 42 MED. POST 18 
(2006). 
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sectors of society.”69  In line with such rhetoric, the government appears 
poised to promote new HIV/AIDS policy.  A Federal Program on AIDS 
currently being developed by the Ministries of Health and Social 
Development “is expected to reflect significant adjustments of the national 
response . . . .”70  The Russian government has also taken steps in regional 
leadership in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS.  In 2006, Russia hosted an 
Eastern European regional meeting on HIV/AIDS.71  Finally, the 
government has committed to increasing HIV/AIDS funding.72  In 2006, 
President Putin allocated over one hundred million dollars for HIV/AIDS 
treatment and prevention, a twenty-fold increase over previous allotments.73  
Through both national and international funds, Russian authorities expect to 
treat approximately 30,000 people in the next year.74 
Such steps indicate that the government recognizes “HIV . . . is poised 
to begin spreading quickly through the general population.”75  According to 
the director of the Russian Federal AIDS Centre in Moscow, because the 
number of deaths from HIV/AIDS is still small, this might be “the last 
opportunity to prevent further spread of HIV infection and to prevent the 
generalization of the epidemic in Russia.”76 
III. BECAUSE HIV/AIDS AND DRUG USE ARE HIGHLY STIGMATIZED IN 
RUSSIA, INCREASED HEALTH PRIVACY MAY ENCOURAGE TREATMENT 
Despite the Russian government’s increased funding for HIV/AIDS 
prevention, policy should take into account the specific factors necessary for 
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in Russia.  Provision of appropriate 
health services is essential to the treatment of HIV/AIDS.77  In particular, 
ARV therapy may reduce the likelihood that an infected individual will 
                                           
69
  UNAIDS, Russian Federation, http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/russian_ 
federation.asp [hereinafter UNAIDS, Russian Federation]. 
70
  Id. 
71
  Dore Hollander, Russia Owns Up to HIV, 38 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH 124, 124 (2006). 
72
  WHO, supra note 2, at 1. 
73
  Id. 
74
  Russia Suffering Great Economic Losses, supra note 37, at 1; see also UNAIDS, Russian 
Federation, supra note 69 (noting that the total expected budget for 2007 is double that of 2006 with “[t]he 
total state budget increas[ing by] more than US $400 million, adding to the substantial funds” of 
international donors). 
75
  Hollander, supra note 71, at 124. 
76
  Murray, supra note 68 (internal citation omitted). 
77
  Peter Aggleton et al., HIV/AIDS and Injecting Drug Use: Information, Education, and 
Communication, 16S INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y S21, S22 (2005). 
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transmit HIV.78  Ultimately, providing effective treatment requires testing 
individuals for HIV infection.79  Effective HIV testing is thus of 
“paramount” importance in the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS.80 
Yet encouraging testing may entail requiring strong protections for 
health privacy.  The perceived privacy of health-related information may 
increase voluntary behaviors—such as seeking testing—which, in turn, may 
reduce transmission.  A recent study in Botswana found that individuals that 
held “stigmatizing attitudes” towards HIV infection were less likely to seek 
testing.81  The study also identified knowledge that the results would remain 
confidential as one of the most common facilitating factors in an individual’s 
decision to be tested.82 
Similarly, confidentiality concerns unique to IDUs may act as a 
barrier to accessing treatment.  Early access to drug treatment may prevent 
future cases of HIV infection associated with injection drug use.83  Yet 
Russian IDUs who access state treatment facilities must officially register 
with the facility, which can lead to restrictions on employment and increased 
social stigma.84  Drug treatment centers may share the names of registered 
IDUs with the police. 85  Thus, fears of a lack of confidentiality associated 
with treatment can pose a significant barrier to accessing care in Russia.86 
Assuming that testing will lead to treatment and that increasing 
treatment may reduce HIV/AIDS transmission rates, Russian policy should 
specifically encourage at-risk individuals to seek HIV testing.  Because 
health information is especially sensitive,87 and because individuals living 
with HIV/AIDS in Russia face particular stigma based on health status—
                                           
78
  See Julio S G Montaner et al., The Case for Expanding Access to Highly Active Antiretroviral 
Therapy to Curb the Growth of the HIV Epidemic, 368 LANCET 531, 531 (2006) (noting that highly active 
antiretroviral therapy (HAART), a type of ARV therapy, has been shown to reduce the viral load of HIV 
positive study participants, and that increased viral load predicts increased HIV transmission). 
79
  Stuart Rennie & Frieda Behets, Desperately Seeking Targets: The Ethics of Routine HIV Testing 
in Low-Income Countries, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 52, 52 (2006). 
80
  UNAIDS/WHO, UNAIDS/WHO Policy Statement on HIV Testing, http://www.who.int/hiv/ 
pub/vct/en/hivtestingpolicy04.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2006); see also Don C. Des Jarlais et al., 
Interventions to Reduce the Sexual Risk Behavior of Injecting Drug Users, 16S INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y, S59, 
S61 (2005) (noting that studies of IDUs “show[] that [those] who learn that they are HIV-positive greatly 
increase their use of condoms . . . .”). 
81
  Weiser et al., supra note 11, at 1013. 
82
  Id. at 1018. 
83
  Natalia Bobrova et al., Barriers to Accessing Drug Treatment in Russia: A Qualitative Study 
Among Injecting Drug Users in Two Cities, 82 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S57, S57 (2006). 
84
  Id. at S59. 
85
  Id. at S60. 
86
  See id. at S59-60. 
87
  LISA M. BOYLE & DAVID M. MACK, HIPAA: A GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
LAW, 1:2 (5th ed. 2006). 
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and, in many cases, drug use—policy should promote the protection of 
individual health information. 
IV. WHILE RUSSIAN LAW PROTECTS HEALTH INFORMATION, THE 
PARAMETERS OF HEALTH PRIVACY ARE UNCLEAR 
The Russian Constitution, the highest source of domestic law,88 
guarantees the right to personal privacy.89  While it is unclear whether the 
constitutional protection of privacy impliedly includes health privacy, 
express protections in Russian and international law provide such a statutory 
right.90  Despite these express statutory protections of health privacy, laws 
specifically related to HIV/AIDS and narcotics provide only minimal health 
privacy protections.91  Current statutory limitations on health privacy in 
Russian HIV/AIDS and narcotics laws are overbroad and, because health 
privacy protections in existing legislation conflict, the parameters of privacy 
protection remain unclear. 
A. Russian and International Laws Provide Privacy Protections for 
Health-Related Information 
Because the Russian Constitution expressly protects personal 
information,92 it may impliedly protect information pertaining to health.  Yet, 
regardless of whether health privacy is constitutionally protected, Russian 
and international law provide an express statutory right to health privacy.93 
1. Russian Domestic Law Protects Health-Related Information 
Articles 23 and 24 of the Russian Constitution provide basic 
protections for personal privacy that could be construed to protect health-
related information.94  Under Article 23(1), “[e]veryone shall have the right 
to the inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets . . . .”95  And, 
under Article 24(1) “[t]he collection, keeping, use[,] and dissemination of 
information about the private life of a person shall not be allowed without 
                                           
88
  WILLIAM BURNHAM ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 10 (3rd ed. 
2004). 
89
  Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23-24. 
90
  See infra Part IV.A. 
91
  See infra Part IV.B. 
92
  See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23(1), 24(1). 
93
  See infra IV.A. 
94
  See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] arts. 23(1), 24(1). 
95
  Id. art. 23(1). 
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his or her consent.”96  This idea of “private life” entails “the functioning of 
the individual in the special areas of family, social, personal and intimate 
relations” including the “certainty of entrusting one’s personal and family 
secrets with . . . a doctor . . . .”97  Thus, information about personal health, 
such as a diagnosis, could qualify as information pertaining to “private life” 
under Article 23(1). 
But while the scope of the constitutional right to privacy remains 
uncertain, the statutory right to health privacy is clear.  Several Russian 
statutes reportedly based on the Constitution expressly protect health 
information.  For example, two laws enacted in 2006, a law related to 
personal data98 (“Law on Personal Data”) and a law on “Information, 
Informational Technologies, and Protection of Information,”99 expressly 
protect personal information.  Under the Law on Personal Data, the 
collection, use, and dissemination of personal data related to health is 
generally prohibited.100  Likewise, under a law regarding health protection, 
(“Law on Health Protection”) doctors are obligated to keep “medical 
secrets.”101  Such “medical secrets” include “[i]nformation about 
. . . requesting medical aid, [a] person’s state of health, the diagnosis of his 
illness, and other data received during his observation and treatment . . . .”102  
Notably, under the Law on Health Protection, patients have an express 
personal right to the privacy of such information.103 
                                           
96
  Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution]; see also BURNHAM ET AL., supra 
note 88, at 248 (noting that Article 56(3) lists those rights not subject to any limitation, including those 
granted under Articles 23(1) and 24). 
97
  Igor Petrukhin, The Judicial Protection of the Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in Russia:  
Myths and Realties, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 25, 41-42  (Mark 
Gibney & Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 1999). 
98
  See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (Part I), Item 3457 (“Federal Law No. 152-FZ of July 27, 2006 on Personal 
Data”) [hereinafter Law on Personal Data]. 
99
  See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (Part I), Item 3448 (“Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006 on Information, 
Informational Technologies and Protection of Information”). 
100
  Law on Personal Data, supra note 98, art. 10(1). 
101
  See Vedomosti S”ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Verkhovnogo Soveta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ved. RF] [Bulletin of the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Russian 
Federation and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation] 1993, No. 30, p. 1318, art. 60 (“Fundamentals 
of the Legislation of the Russian Federation on Health Protection No. 5487-1 of July 22, 1993”) 
[hereinafter Law on Health Protection]. 
102
  Id. art. 61. 
103
 See id. art. 30(6). 
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2. International Law Protects Health-Related Information 
In addition to express statutory protections for health privacy, 
international law provides broad, but undefined, protections for health-
related information.  Article 15(4) of the 1993 Russian Constitution directly 
incorporates treaties, customary international law, and “generally recognized 
principles and norms of international law.”104  And, under Article 15(4) of 
the Constitution, treaty law preempts inconsistent domestic law.105   
Russia is a party to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Human Rights Convention” or 
“Convention”),106 which impliedly provides for privacy of health 
information.  The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has 
construed the Human Rights Convention’s guarantee of the “right to respect 
for . . . private and family life”107 as including medical information.108  The 
ECHR has noted that “the protection of personal data, particularly medical 
data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her 
right to respect for private and family life . . . . Respecting the confidentiality 
of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention.”109  Because international legal instruments 
signed by Russia are incorporated into Russian law, the protection of 
personal data under Russian law includes a broad right to the protection of 
medical data. 
B. Russian Laws Related to HIV/AIDS and Narcotics Provide Limited 
Protections for Information Related to Health Status 
In contrast to clear statutory protections for health privacy in domestic 
and international law, Russian legislation specifically related to HIV/AIDS 
and narcotics offer limited protection for health information.110 
                                           
104
  William F. Flanagan, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights in Russia: Compliance and the Rule of Law, 
39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 39, 58 (2001) (arguing that this “broad reference” incorporates new developments 
in international law, “including decisions of competent international bodies . . . .”). 
105
  Id. 
106
  See Council of Eur., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: 
Member States of the Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT= 
005&CM=7&DF=3/21/2007&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
107
  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
en/Treaties/Word/005.doc. 
108
  See M. S. v. Sweden, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, 337 (1997). 
109
  Id. 
110
  See infra Part IV.B. 
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1. HIV/AIDS Laws Provide Weak Protection for Health Privacy 
The federal law on HIV/AIDS prevention, “On the Prevention of the 
Incidence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Disease in the 
Russian Federation” (“Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation”),111 provides for 
only limited confidentiality of health-related information. 
First, by allowing for extensive mandatory HIV testing, the Omnibus 
HIV/AIDS Legislation limits the rights of individuals to make confidential 
decisions about health.  The legislation broadly defines the categories of 
people subject to the law as “[d]onors of blood, biological liquids, organs 
and tissues,”112 and “workers of particular trades, production units, 
enterprises, institutions and organizations, whose list is approved by the 
Government of the Russian Federation.”113  Regulations issued in 1995 
require that individuals who perform medical examinations, and who 
diagnose and treat people with HIV/AIDS, are subject to such tests.114  Still, 
the otherwise vague language of the law may authorize extensive testing of 
undefined groups,115 leaving fewer individuals with the right to make 
confidential decisions about health. 
Second, in contrast to the Law on Health Protection,116 the Omnibus 
HIV/AIDS Legislation does not require that individuals administering such 
tests keep results confidential.  Instead, the law gives individuals the choice 
to seek confidentiality and does not presume it.117  Under the law, where 
either governmental or private institutions administer voluntary tests, 
individuals may request that those results remain anonymous.118  Thus, in 
contrast to the Law on Health Protection,119 the Omnibus HIV/AIDS 
Legislation does not expressly require confidentiality of test results of 
individuals who fail to make such requests.120 
                                           
111
  Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7. 
112
  Id. art. 9(1). 
113
 Id. art. 9(3). 
114
  Flanagan, supra note 104, at 61. 
115
  VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38 (noting that vague terms have caused concern about 
potential human rights abuses resulting from “[l]ack of information about the law on the part of testing 
personnel and the person to be tested . . .”). 
116
  See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 60. 
117
  Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 8. 
118
  Id. art. 8. 
119
  See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 60. 
120
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 11; see also Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra 
note 7, art. 9 (neglecting to include protections for confidentiality).  But see Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Nov. 9, 
1995, art. 14 (“Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1017 of October 13, 1995 on 
Approving the Rules for Carrying out an Obligatory Medical Examination to Reveal the Virus of the 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Man (the HIV-Infection)”) (noting that “[m]edical workers and 
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2. Narcotics Laws Fail to Effectively Protect Health Information 
Like the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, Russian narcotics 
legislation lacks strong protections for health privacy.  A 1998 law, “On 
Narcotic Agents and Psychotropic Substances,”121 (“Narcotics Law”) 
criminalizes possession and use of illicit drugs122 and authorizes compulsory 
examination123 and registration of drug users.124  Under the law, treatment of 
drug users is authorized “only at the institutions of the state and in the 
municipal public health systems.”125  Such provisions arguably conflict with 
protections for health information delineated in the Law on Health 
Protection.126  Furthermore, it is unclear whether protections granted under 
the Law on Health Protection would override the limits placed on health 
privacy under the Narcotics Law.  Thus, because there is no express right to 
health privacy in the Narcotics Law, the provisions authorizing compulsory 
treatment and registration threaten individuals’ health privacy. 
Similarly, recent amendments to the Criminal Code neglect to provide 
effective privacy protection.  As noted above, amendments to the Criminal 
Code allow for needle exchanges where needles are distributed in order to 
curb infectious disease.127  Yet, the Ministry of Health has yet to issue 
guidelines for distribution of needles.128  Without such regulations, federal 
legislation does not clearly define the connection between drug use and 
HIV/AIDS.  A lack of regulations means a lack of effective protection of the 
health status of individuals with HIV/AIDS seeking treatment for drug use. 
                                                                                                                              
other persons made aware of the results of the examination through their official or professional duties 
shall be obliged to keep this information secret.”) (emphasis added).   
121
  See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 1998, No. 2, Item 219 (“Federal Law No. 3-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Narcotic Agents and 
Psychotropic Substances”). 
122
  Id. art. 59. 
123
  Id. art. 44 (noting that a “person, with respect to whom there are sufficient grounds to believe that 
he suffers from narcomania, is in the state of narcotic intoxication, or has consumed a narcotic agent 
without a doctor’s prescription, may be sent for a medical examination.”). 
124
  Id. art. 56. 
125
  Id. art. 55(2). 
126
  See Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 61. 
127
  Niedowski, supra note 6; see also Criminal Code Amendments, supra note 59, art. 230 (“The 
operation of this Article shall not extend to instances of popularization, for the purpose of preventing HIV 
infection and other dangerous infectious diseases, of appropriate tools and equipment usable for 
consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, where these deeds have been committed by 
approbation of the executive bodies in charge of health care . . . .”). 
128
  Niedowski, supra note 6. 
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C. Current Permissible Disclosures of Health Information Are 
Overbroad and Statutory Protections Are in Conflict 
Limits on the protection of health information in current legislation 
are overbroad.  First, while the right to health privacy is clearly protected by 
statute,129 if this right is derived from the constitutional right to privacy, the 
right is not subject to restriction.  The Russian Constitution permits the 
restriction of individual rights as required for the “protection of the 
fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, [and] 
health . . . .”130  Yet specific constitutional rights, including the right to 
privacy, may be not limited.131  Thus, if health privacy is implicit in the 
constitutional right to privacy, limits on that right in existing law may be 
invalid. 
Second, the means chosen for the restriction of even a statutory right 
must be proportionate to the threat posed by the exercise of that right.132  As 
the Russian Constitutional Court has noted with regard to such 
proportionality, “norm[s] should be formally defined, exact, sharp, and clear, 
not allowing an expanded interpretation of the limitations 
established . . . .”133 
Current restrictions on health privacy under Russian statutes are 
disproportionate responses to the threats posed by the exercise of the right.  
For example, the authorization of mandatory HIV testing under the Omnibus 
HIV/AIDS Legislation134 is a disproportionate response to the threat of 
transmission of disease.  The annual testing of millions of people135 may not 
effectively target those at risk of infection or elucidate the dynamics of the 
epidemic.136  In particular, more targeted screening of well-defined groups 
could lead to a greater understanding of the Russian HIV epidemic and 
allow the design of more effective interventions.137  Similarly, limits on 
health privacy under the Law on Health Protection are disproportionate to 
the threat posed by confidentiality.  Under the law, “medical secrets” may be 
                                           
129
  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
130
  Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 55(3). 
131
  Id. art. 56(3). 
132
  BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 249. 
133
  Id., supra note 88, at 250 (quoting Sabranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatssi [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 44, Item 4358 (“On Provisions of the Federal 
Statute ‘On the Basic Guaranties of Election Rights and of the Right to Participate in a Referendum of 
Citizens of the Russian Federation.”). 
134
  Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 9. 
135
  VINOKUR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38. 
136
  See Lowndes et al., supra note 3, at 56. 
137
  Id. at 56-57; see also supra Part II.C. 
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released in the case of “a threat of the spread of infectious diseases, mass 
poisoning, or contagion”138 or “when there are grounds for the belief that an 
injury to the health of a person has been inflicted as the result of illegal 
actions.”139  Because HIV infection could be a “threat of the spread” of an 
infectious disease, and because suspected injection drug use could be a basis 
for believing that injury resulted from illegal behavior, the law might widely 
allow the release of any information related to HIV infection despite the fact 
that not all incidences of HIV infection are likely to result in the further 
spread of infectious disease. 
Finally, even if current limits on health privacy are not overbroad, 
conflicts in existing law leave the parameters of health privacy protection 
unclear.  For example, under the Law on Health Protection, unless an 
exception applies, it is “impermissible to disclose information that makes up 
a medical secret,” including diagnosis.140  But under the Omnibus 
HIV/AIDS Legislation, where voluntary tests are administered, individuals 
must request that results remain anonymous.141  This suggests that the Law 
on Health Protection’s presumption of confidentiality conflicts with the 
apparent opposite presumption under the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation 
—that it is the patient’s responsibility to ensure confidentiality.  Such 
conflicts ultimately obscure the parameters of the statutory right. 
V. REMEDIES IN CURRENT RUSSIAN LAW DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT 
PROTECTION OF HEALTH PRIVACY 
While remedies may promote compliance with law, a lack of precise 
remedial measures leaves individuals’ rights uncertain.142  Vague remedial 
measures and an uncertain path to legal redress for violations of health 
privacy create greater ambiguity with regard to the scope of the statutory 
right.143 
A. Clear Remedies Deter Future Violations of Law 
Rights may be less valuable if not accompanied by effective 
remedies.144  This is because remedies ideally “redress [a] wrong by creating 
                                           
138
  Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, art. 61(2). 
139
  Id. art. 61(5). 
140
  Id. art. 61. 
141
  Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 8. 
142
  Infra Part V.A. 
143
  See infra Part V.B-C. 
144
  See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human Rights Law, 
38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 515, 525 (2000). 
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the situation that would have existed had the wrong not occurred.”145  
Effective remedies may also result in deterrence, whereby punishment 
influences the behavior of potential actors.146  Remedies are assumed to have 
deterrent quality “because rational actors weigh the anticipated costs of 
transgressions against the anticipated benefits.”147  Finally, remedies are 
believed to promote future compliance.148   
Remedies may be in the form of restitution, or, where restitution is not 
feasible, compensation.149  Where compensation is utilized, “every legal 
system should strive for certainty in calculating damages to avoid under- or 
over-compensating a victim” because “arbitrariness in awards undermines 
respect for the law . . . .” 150  In this way, certainty in remedies can reinforce 
rule of law: clarity “implies that society administers justice by fixing 
standards that individuals may determine prior to controversy and that 
reasonably guarantee all individuals like treatment.”151 
B. Vague Remedies for Breaches of Health Privacy Under Russian Law 
Fail to Promote Compliance 
Current laws related to HIV/AIDS and privacy provide vague 
remedies for violations.152  Such unclear remedies likely do not effectively 
deter breaches of confidentiality.153  And, though international law provides 
a private right of action for the violation of health privacy, available 
international legal remedies are not likely to deter future violations. 154 
1. Russian Law Provides Vague Remedies for Breaches of Health 
Privacy 
Various sources of Russian law provide remedies for breaches of 
privacy generally, yet such remedies do not clearly apply to breaches of 
health privacy.  First, sources of law that expressly relate to health neglect to 
specify which types of violations merit specific liability.  For example, the 
Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation and the Law on Health Protection provide 
                                           
145
  JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
146
  DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 13 (2d ed. 2005). 
147
  Id. 
148
  Wolcher, supra note 144, at 524. 
149
  SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9. 
150
  Id. at 20.  But see id. at 21 (noting that, in the case of human rights violations, “compensation as a 
remedy should not diminish consideration of the need for other kinds of redress.”). 
151
  Id. 
152
  Infra Part V.B.1. 
153
  Infra Part V.B.2. 
154
  See SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9. 
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for disciplinary, administrative, and criminal liability,155 but do not define 
what constitutes a breach of the law, or which type of breach would result in 
a penalty. 
Second, while the Russian Criminal Code,156 Administrative Code,157 
and Civil Code158 provide for clear remedial action for the violation of the 
right to privacy generally, these enactments do not explicitly pertain to 
health information.  For example, under the Criminal Code, “[i]llegal 
. . . spreading of information about the private life of a person . . . without 
his consent,” may be punished by a fine of up to two hundred thousand 
rubles, by the income of a person for up to eighteen months, or by 
compulsory labor for up to 180 hours.159  While sanctions under the law are 
clear, they may not apply to violations of health privacy.  Similarly, the Civil 
Code provides a remedial right associated with violations of personal non-
property rights—including the right to personal privacy.160  In particular, 
Article 151 of the Civil Code grants courts the authority to impose monetary 
compensation for violations of personal privacy rights.161  While the Civil 
Code leaves the scope of potential violations and of possible monetary fines 
undefined, it authorizes courts to consider “the extent of the culprit’s guilt” 
as well as “the depth of the physical and moral sufferings” of the victim.162  
If privacy includes health privacy, violations of confidentiality could warrant 
a penalty under Article 151.  However, this interpretation is unclear from the 
plain language of the Code.163 
Because laws referencing health privacy do not clarify how remedies 
should be applied, and because clear remedies for violation of privacy do not 
expressly relate to health privacy, the scope of remedies for violations of 
health privacy remain unclear.  As such, current laws likely do not 
effectively deter breaches of health privacy.164 
                                           
155
  Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation, supra note 7, art. 24; Law on Health Protection, supra note 101, 
art. 61. 
156
  Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 137(1). 
157
  Kodeks RF ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh [KOAP] [Code of Administrative 
Violations] arts. 13(11)-(13). 
158
  Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 150. 
159
  Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 137(1). 
160
  See Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 150. 
161
  See id art. 151; see also BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 371 (noting that Article 1064 allows 
courts to impose both economic and non-economic damages, and generally provides for the full 
compensation of harm by the person who has willfully or negligently caused such harm). 
162
  Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 151. 
163
  Furthermore, the author knows of no judicial opinions interpreting the scope of this article. 
164
  See SHELTON, supra note 146, at 20 (noting that, in general, “arbitrariness in [remedies] 
undermines respect for the law . . .”). 
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2. Though International Law Grants a Private Right of Action for 
Violations of Health Privacy, It Likely Does Not Promote Deterrence 
The Russian Constitution guarantees the right to appeal to 
international bodies for the protection of human rights upon exhaustion of 
local remedies.165  Yet such a right does not promote future compliance with 
Russian domestic laws related to health privacy. 
The Human Rights Convention provides only limited individual 
remedies.  Under Protocol 9 to the Human Rights Convention, to which 
Russia is a party,166 individuals have a private right of action for Convention 
violations.167  However, under the Convention, the ECHR does not have the 
remedial power to order a state to change its laws.168  While Russia’s laws 
related to health privacy have not been tested before the ECHR,169 the court 
would lack the power to bring the law into compliance with international 
legal obligations.  Thus, while an individual may obtain legal redress 
through the ECHR, a judgment proclaiming a breach of confidentiality 
would likely not deter future breaches involving different individuals.170 
C. Inadequacies in the Russian Judicial and Regulatory Systems Leave 
Individuals Without Access to Remedial Measures 
In addition to a lack of predictable remedies for breaches of rights 
related to health privacy, individuals with HIV/AIDS in Russia lack a 
consistent means of achieving redress.171  Access to justice implies that 
existing procedures are “capable of redressing the harm . . . inflicted.”172  
                                           
165
  Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 46(3). 
166
  See Council of Eur., Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  and 
Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=140&CM= 
7&DF=5/4/2007&CL=ENG (last visited May 4, 2007); see also Protocol No. 9 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 6, 
1990, Europ. T.S. No. 140, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/140.doc 
[hereinafter Protocol No. 9], superseded by Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/155.doc [hereinafter Protocol No. 11]. 
167
  Wolcher, supra note 144, at 551; Protocol No. 9, supra note 166, art. 5; Protocol No. 11 supra 
note 166, art. 34. 
168
  Wolcher, supra note 144, at 552. 
169
  See BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 245 (noting that in the ten decisions involving Russia 
before the court by 2004, all went against Russia and most dealt with “procedural failures.”). 
170
  But see id. at 234-35 (noting that, while few cases from Russia have been brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights, the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code allows for the reopening of a 
previously decided case based on the ruling of the European Court) (citing Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2001, No. 52 (part I), Item 
1921, art 413 (4)(2)). 
171
  See infra Part V.C.1. 
172
  SHELTON, supra note 146, at 9. 
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But in Russia the overlapping jurisdiction of courts and executive bodies 
leave the path to redress uncertain.173 
1. The Jurisdictional Reach of Russian Courts Obscures the Path to 
Redress 
While the Russian Constitution explicitly grants citizens the right to 
seek remedies before a court,174 it is unclear which courts have jurisdiction 
to hear claims based on violations of health privacy. 
The structure and function of the Russian judiciary creates this 
uncertainty.  The courts of the Russian judiciary are divided into three 
parallel branches.175  While the three branches comprise a single system,176 
the courts’ overlapping jurisdiction threatens their authority.177  Currently, 
two branches of the judiciary may interpret the same law differently.178  
Alternatively, courts charged with a particular duty by law may altogether 
neglect to fulfill that function.179  For example, while the Constitutional 
Court is the only Court with the legal authority to analyze the 
constitutionality of enactments,180 under the current system, “it is not clear 
that the referral of all constitutional issues is mandatory.”181  Finally, the 
effect of precedent in the Russian legal system is unclear.182  While the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation can issue “explanations” of the 
law as direction for lower courts, jurists have long debated the legal effects 
of such decisions, in particular, whether they constitute normative legal 
sources.183 
                                           
173
  See infra Part V.C.1-2. 
174
  Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 46(1). 
175
  Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: Russia’s Courts of 
General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2006) 
(noting that the three courts include the Constitutional Court, courts of general jurisdiction, and “arbitrazh” 
(commercial courts)). 
176
  W.E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 154 (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
177
  Pamela Jordan, Russian Courts: Enforcing the Rule of Law? in BUILDING THE RUSSIAN STATE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 193, 195 (Valerie Sperling ed., 
2000). 
178
  BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 51. 
179
  See id. at 98. 
180
  Marat Salikov, Russia’s Transition to Democracy: Constitutional Justice and the Protection of 
Civil Liberties, 24, in THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN RUSSIA (William Vanden Heuvel ed., 2000).  The 
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over legislation such as federal laws, acts of the President, acts of the 
State Duma, and acts of the Russian Federation.  BUTLER, supra note 176, at 157.  The Court may also 
consider alleged violations of constitutional rights of citizens, and may interpret the Constitution.  Id. 
181
  BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 88, at 98. 
182
  See Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized Model: The Russian Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 735 (1997). 
183
  See id. 
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The overlapping jurisdiction of courts also threatens the path to 
consistent legal redress for violations of health privacy.  For example, an 
individual might be able to sue in either the Supreme Court or the 
Constitutional Court for violations of health privacy.  The Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation is the highest court of general jurisdiction,184 with 
appellate jurisdiction over all legal disputes not assigned to the other judicial 
branches.185  The Supreme Court hears civil, criminal, and administrative 
cases,186 and has issued decisions regarding rights to privacy protected under 
the Russian Constitution187 and the Civil Code.188  Alternately, because the 
Constitutional Court may consider alleged violations of constitutional rights 
of citizens or the constitutionality of federal laws,189 a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of limits to health privacy in existing statute could be 
brought before the Constitutional Court.  Such unresolved jurisdiction 
renders courts unable to consistently redress violations of health privacy. 
2. The Lack of a Central Authority Governing Health-Related 
Information Leaves Remedies Uncertain 
Finally, individuals lack a clear administrative remedy for violations 
of health privacy under existing law.  While current laws appear to 
contemplate a shared role for courts and executive bodies to hear complaints 
related to privacy, these laws neglect to specify designated executive bodies 
for such hearings.190  For example, the Law on Health Protection states that 
individuals injured by state institutions may appeal to state bodies but 
neglects to name any particular state body. 191  Similarly, the Administrative 
Code delegates the trial of administrative offenses related to breaches of 
privacy to unspecified “[b]odies exercising state supervision over 
                                           
184
  BUTLER, supra note 176, at 161. 
185
  See Krug, supra note 182, at 726-30. 
186
  BUTLER, supra note 176, at 161.  The Supreme Court can initiate review of lower court decisions.  
See Krug, supra note 182, at 733-34. 
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communication.”192  Likewise, the Law on Personal Data authorizes an 
unnamed executive body to hear complaints based on misuse of general 
personal information.193  Finally, while the State Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Health and Social Development 
is authorized to try public health offenses,194 the Ministry’s authority does 
not expressly include offenses related to health privacy.  In effect, no law 
clearly defines the path to legal redress before an executive body for 
violations of health privacy. 
VI. A LAW AUTHORIZING AGENCY OVERSIGHT AND CLARIFYING REMEDIAL 
MEASURES PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE IN RUSSIA 
The United States’ comprehensive health privacy law provides insight 
for legislative change in Russia.  In 1996, the United States enacted 
comprehensive health privacy legislation, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).195  The legislation and accompanying 
regulations protect personal health information, are enforced by a dedicated 
office within a federal agency, and specify clear remedial measures for 
violations of health privacy.196  While comparisons to foreign health privacy 
law must be undertaken with careful consideration of the specific limitations 
of the Russian legal system, Russia should, like the United States, further 
clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation 
of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement.197 
A. The HIPAA Clearly Defines and Provides Mechanisms for Redress of 
Violations of Health Privacy 
Unlike Russian Law related to health privacy, HIPAA and 
accompanying regulations clearly define the parameters and appropriate 
disclosures of protected health information.198  HIPAA provides guidelines 
for the promulgations of standards related to privacy,199 and provides for 
clear remedial action.200 
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1. The HIPAA Defines Permissible Uses of Personal Health Information 
The HIPAA provides comprehensive protection of health 
information201  and provides for the preemption of less stringent state 
privacy laws.202  As such, HIPAA creates a “‘floor’ of privacy protection 
rather than a ‘ceiling,’” with a general baseline of uniformity.203 A major 
principle of the related regulations “is to define and limit the circumstances 
in which an individual’s protected hea[l]th information may be used or 
disclosed by covered entities.”204  HIPAA covers entities that handle 
personal health information205 and expressly authorizes the regulation of 
“individually identifiable health information,” including “oral, written, or 
otherwise recorded information that is created or received by an employer, 
health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse” relating to 
personal health.206  Identifiable information, otherwise known as “protected 
health information”207 (“PHI”) includes information relating to an 
individual’s physical or mental health condition, to the provision of health 
care to the individual, or to the payment for health care that could reasonably 
be used to identify the individual.208  Thus, information related to HIV 
infection status qualifies as PHI.209 
The regulations accompanying HIPAA (“Privacy Standards”) allow 
limited disclosures of PHI.  A covered entity may disclose PHI:  1) to the 
individual; 2) for treatment and payment; 3) where there is an implied 
opportunity to agree or object to use; 4) incident to otherwise permitted uses 
and disclosures; 5) for the public interest; and 6) for limited research.210  In 
the case of disclosures for the public interest, specific limitations apply so as 
to balance an individual’s interest in personal privacy and the public need for 
information.211  For example, in the case of disclosure of PHI for public 
health activities, a covered entity may disclose PHI only to limited named 
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  BOYLE & MACK, supra note 87, at 4:8. 
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  Id. at 4:7-8. 
203
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  Id. at 6. 
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groups including public health authorities authorized to collect information 
for controlling disease.212  To avert a serious threat to public safety, covered 
entities may disclose PHI to someone whom they believe can avert the 
threat.213  Finally, covered entities must develop and utilize procedures to 
limit disclosures.214 
Like HIPAA, Russian law related to health privacy contemplates 
appropriate uses and disclosures of health information; yet, unlike HIPAA, 
Russian law provides broad exceptions for disclosure.  Under Russian law, 
information constituting a “medical secret” may be disclosed: 1) for 
treatment; 2) where there is a threat of the spread of infectious disease; 3) at 
the request of a court; 4) when aiding a minor; and 5) where injury to a 
person may have resulted from illegal action.215  While such disclosures are 
similar to those permitted under HIPAA, unlike HIPAA, Russian law does 
not limit to whom such information may be disclosed.  Nor does the law 
provide guidance as to which personal information may be disclosed.  
Instead, the law appears to leave such questions to the discretion of the 
health care provider or the party seeking the information.  As such, for 
example, the exception for disclosure in the case of the threat of the spread 
of infectious disease216 could leave individuals with HIV/AIDS vulnerable to 
unlimited disclosure of information pertaining to their health status. 
2. While Both Russian Law and HIPAA Delegate Rulemaking Authority 
to Administrative Bodies, Russian Law Lacks Clear Guidelines for 
Promulgation of Standards 
Both HIPAA and Russian law provide for agency oversight of 
regulations related to public health.  Yet Russian law lacks clear guidelines 
with respect to the promulgation of health privacy regulations. 
The HIPAA authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“DHHS”) to submit recommendations to Congress 
regarding the appropriate uses of PHI.217  The resulting Privacy Standards 
must clarify the rights of individuals with respect to health privacy, 
procedures through which individuals are able to exercise those rights, and 
which disclosures of such information are allowed or required.218  Originally, 
                                           
212
  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b).   
213
  OCR PRIVACY BRIEF, supra note 204, at 8 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)).   
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HIPAA authorized DHHS to issue final regulations governing the use of PHI 
if Congress had not enacted privacy legislation within three years of the 
enactment of HIPAA.219  Because Congress did not enact such legislation 
within three years, DHHS developed a final rule, subject to public notice and 
comment.220 
Similar to provisions under HIPAA, Russian legislation authorizes the 
promulgation of standards that affect health.  Yet, while various Russian 
executive bodies are authorized to promulgate regulations relating to health 
or privacy, none of the bodies are specifically authorized to draft or 
promulgate health privacy regulations.  For example, the Ministry of Health 
and Social Development is responsible for elaborating policy related to 
public health in general221 and HIV prevention in particular, 222 and for 
submitting drafts of proposed legislation to the government.223  The Ministry 
is not expressly authorized to adopt rules related to health privacy.  
Likewise, the Law on Personal Data authorizes an executive body to submit 
proposed legislation to the government relating to privacy,224 but does not 
mandate that such proposals include those related to health privacy.   
3. Unlike Remedies Available Under Russian Law, HIPAA Provides 
Clear Remedies for Breaches of Health Privacy 
While remedies available for breaches of privacy under Russian law 
are unpredictable, HIPAA and the Privacy Standards provide clearly defined 
remedial measures.  The HIPAA Privacy Standards seek to promote 
compliance among covered entities.225  And, HIPAA does not provide for a 
private right of action for individuals harmed by failures of compliance.226  
Rather, a person who is a victim of conduct proscribed by HIPAA may file a 
written complaint with the Secretary of DHHS through the Office for Civil 
Rights.227  The Secretary has the discretion to investigate and to impose civil 
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or criminal penalties.228  Primary enforcement is carried out through the 
investigation of complaints.229 
HIPAA provides for both civil and criminal penalties.230 The law 
provides for civil penalties when “the failure to comply [with the statute] 
was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.”231  Each violation may 
result in a $100 civil penalty; civil penalties are capped at $25,000 per 
person or entity per year for any specific violation.232  The United States 
Department of Justice enforces HIPAA’s criminal penalties upon receipt of 
complaints from DHHS.233  Criminal penalties result where “a person 
knowingly and in violation” of HIPAA, discloses PHI.234  The maximum 
penalty is exacted for offenses “committed with the intent to sell, transfer, or 
use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage,” 
for which an individual can be sentenced to ten years in prison and fined 
$250,000.235 
Alternately, while violations of health privacy under Russian law may 
involve civil, criminal, or administrative penalties, the path to legal redress 
and the parameters of such liability remain unclear.  First, while the Law on 
Personal Data authorizes an executive body to grant injunctions against the 
misuse of information236 and to appeal to a court on behalf of a victim of a 
violation,237 the law neglects to name such a body or to designate an agency 
in charge of health-related violations.  Second, both the Omnibus HIV/AIDS 
Legislation and the Law on Health Protection provide for various types of 
remedies, yet do not specify what constitutes a breach or which type of 
breach would result in a specific penalty.238  Third, remedies for violations of 
privacy under the Criminal Code239 and Civil Code240 do not clearly relate to 
health information or define the scope of liability for violations of health 
privacy.  In effect, vague provisions in existing law likely provide 
inadequate remedies to deter future breaches of confidentiality. 
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B. The HIPAA Provides a Framework for Stronger Health Privacy in 
Russia 
Because monetary considerations alone would likely hinder the 
implementation of a comprehensive system modeled after HIPAA in 
Russia,241 wholesale adoption of legislation like HIPAA in Russia is likely 
unfeasible.  Still, while taking into account the institutional and legal 
differences between the United States and Russia, Russian law should, like 
HIPAA, clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the 
violation of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s 
infringement. 
1. Russian Law Should Provide Clear Rights to Health Privacy 
Like the regulations accompanying HIPAA, Russian law should 
further elucidate permissible and impermissible uses of health information.  
Russian legislation provides protection of the fact that a person has 
requested treatment, of medical diagnosis, and of data regarding 
treatment.242  Yet such explicit protections conflict with the limited 
protections for diagnosis in the Omnibus HIV/AIDS Legislation243 and leave 
health care providers and government bodies with great discretion in the 
protection of health information.  Reconciling protections in existing 
legislation in order to clarify and expand the right to health privacy may 
grant health care providers less discretion in protecting health information 
and may, in turn, encourage individuals to learn their HIV status.244 
Clarifying the right to health privacy entails clarifying responsibility 
for the promulgation of legislation related to that right.  Like HIPAA, 
Russian law should require the drafting and proposal of regulations related 
to health privacy by a single named body.  While HIPAA grants DHHS the 
authority to promulgate regulations related to health privacy, Russian law 
should require that health privacy standards be proposed by an executive 
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body but be enacted by Parliament.  Generally, Russian federal bodies have 
the power to issue normative regulations based on general delegation or by 
ad hoc delegation of the legislature.245  The Ministry of Health, for example, 
may submit drafts of federal laws to the government, and may independently 
adopt normative acts on a variety of specific subjects—none of which 
currently relates to health privacy.246 
Because of the sometimes loosely defined scope of administrative 
authority in Russian law,247 Russian legislation related to health privacy 
should leave limited discretion to an executive body.  For example, 
enactment of the relevant rules for health privacy could be drafted by the 
Ministry of Health because of that agency’s experience with health policy, 
but enacted only through statute, that is, by Parliament,248 in order to ensure 
that infringement on health privacy is minimal.249 
2. Russian Law Should Provide Clear Remedies for Violations of the 
Right to Health Privacy 
To promote compliance, Russian law, like HIPAA, should encompass 
clear remedial measures.  Changes to Russian law must, however, take into 
account the backdrop of Russia’s civil law system.250  In particular, such 
changes to existing remedies would likely have to be applied to various 
Russian legal codes.  Current laws related to HIV/AIDS and privacy allow 
the imposition of administrative, criminal, and civil responsibility,251 
therefore implicating the Administrative, Criminal, and Civil Codes.  While 
these codes allow for various types of remedial measures, they also provide 
for similar remedies.  For example, the violation of privacy entails possible 
imposition of fines under each of the codes.252  As such, current code 
provisions related to privacy leave great discretion to the judge or agency 
hearing a case in the ordering of remedies.  Such ambiguity should be 
limited by amending the codes to provide more explicit direction to judges 
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and agencies as to specific types of remedies applicable to particular 
violations of health privacy. 
3. Changes in Law Should Clarify Legal Processes for Redressing 
Violations 
In addition to clarifying the parameters of health privacy and the 
remedies available for its violation, law related to health privacy should 
present a clear path for legal redress.  Overlapping jurisdiction of the courts 
and the lack of a specifically designated administrative body to handle health 
privacy complaints renders the path to redress unclear.  In light of potential 
problems of individual citizens accessing courts, clear agency oversight, as 
under HIPAA, could provide an alternative to traditional courts as a means 
of securing a remedy. 
Current Russian law related to personal privacy already authorizes 
both a private right of action253 and initiation of action by agencies.254  A law 
specifically related to health privacy should maintain this system.  Unlike 
under HIPAA, the existence of a private right of action may be essential.  In 
the context of the overlapping jurisdiction of the Russian legal system, 
where privacy rights have long been uncertain,255 a private right may be an 
important incentive to encourage seeking redress.  Actual individual 
recoveries under the law could discourage future violations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Existing Russian law allows broad exceptions for the disclosure of 
private health information and fails to provide a clear remedial path for those 
whose rights to privacy have been violated.  Because of a lack of predictable 
remedies for violations of health privacy, Russian law likely does not 
promote compliance.  In turn, a lack of compliance with existing privacy 
protections means that individuals likely to suffer stigma related to drug use 
or HIV/AIDS will not seek governmental assistance.  To encourage 
individuals traditionally subject to discrimination to seek HIV testing, the 
Russian Federation should clarify and reconcile existing protections for 
health privacy. 
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As comprehensive health privacy legislation, HIPAA provides a 
framework for change in Russian law.  The clear definitions and remedial 
actions for violations of health privacy under HIPAA provide a model of 
greater protections for individuals living with HIV/AIDS in Russia.  In 
particular, to promote HIV/AIDS treatment, Russian law should further 
clarify the statutory right to health privacy, the remedies tied to the violation 
of that right, and the path to legal redress for the right’s infringement. 
